When the UK government committed to Net Zero in 2019, it did so on the basis of a theory of global change.

First, it was envisaged that the new net zero commitment within the Climate Change Act would set a framework for investment and development of decarbonised technologies within the UK, and that this in turn would affect the costs for global businesses and other states to decarbonise.   

Second, it was envisaged that the UK’s emissions commitments were important because of the way they would interact with the commitments and policy choices of other states.  This was seen as a two step process.  The UK could have little impact on many of the largest current and future emitters; China, India, Indonesia, and Russia would have scant regard to what we thought or did.  However, what the UK did would be relevant to policy choices by other Western states including the US and the EU.  And, given its geopolitical heft and its own significant emissions, the US could then have influence over other major emitters, particularly if it were to work in concert with its traditional allies among Western states.  This could lead to a negotiated outcome whereby global emissions are lower than would otherwise be the case.

The most obvious way for this to work was through its impact on the diplomatic conversations surrounding the main UNFCCC processes.  A second channel of interaction was expected to be through cross-border opinion formation.  There is good evidence that opinion in the large western democracies is affected by what is happening in other similar countries.  

The approach appeared initially to be working.  Arguably the UK’s commitment to Net Zero in 2019 had some role in catalysing the rush of countries making Net Zero commitments over the following 2 years.   But since then developments have been less encouraging.  The current US government is set against decarbonisation, and there has been only limited progress since 2021 at the UNFCCC.

That said, pressure on the Climate Change Act will come more from how net zero plays out domestically over the next few years.  I expect one of two things to happen.   Either Reform will win the 2029 election on a platform which is opposed to Net Zero.  Or a non-Reform government will have to deal with some more visible, less popular and more expensive next stages of decarbonisation (as required by the Climate Change Act) against a probable background of static (or perhaps reducing) levels of commitment to decarbonisation by other Western states.   Either way, the commitments within the Climate Change Act will be subject to change.

After the next election, a new government may want to make change quickly.   It would be a bad outcome if this was done without a current understanding of the role that the UK’s policy is playing internationally,  and if the only practical choice was between the existing climate policy and no climate policy at all.   We should now be researching two questions

We need an updated view on how the UK’s commitment to Net Zero is affecting the trajectory of global emissions, and the extent to which this would be changed by a possible repeal or substantial modification of the Climate Change Act.

And we need a deeper consideration of the range of alternatives to the current UK framework – specifically, how we should reform the Climate Change Act if it loses political support.  

The Climate Change Committee is a well-resourced body with substantial experience in this area.  Ideally it should be asked to look now at how its original model of global change is playing out and at the best alternatives to the Climate Change Act should reform be required.

Alternatively this could also be an urgent agenda for a well-resourced UK think tank.

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For more on this see my Temperate Zone substack.

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